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SCHELLING'S 
VOM ]CH ALS PRINCIP DER PIIILOSOPI-IIE 
As A READING OF FICHTE'S 
GRUNDLAGE DER GESAMMTEN 
WISSENSCYAFTSLEHNE 
Michael G. Yater 
Fichte wrote the Gn111dl4([e in great haste in 1794-95, though he first formed the idea of a philosophic system built upon the l in 1791. 1 
Before claiming his professorship in Jena as Reinhold's successor, Fichte had 
crafted a _prospectus of the new philosophy, meant to attract students to his 
lectures.2 In "On the Concept ofTheory of Science," he promised a system 
that not only satisfied Reinhold's formal demand-philosophy must be 
based on universally admitted principles-but adopted Reinhold's ultimate 
fact-the subject-ohject stmcture of consciousness-as it'i content. Fichte 
planned the Gnmdla,ge as a course hook to accompany the first set of lec­
tures; it was written, printed, and distributed in installments to Fichte's stu­
dents and selected friends. It was never meant for public view as either a 
popular or technical statement of the system of transcendental philosophy. 
Someone unfamiliar with Fichte's systematic intentions, as announced 
in the "Review of Aenesidemus" and part 3 of the prospectus essay, would 
have found reading the first number of the Grund/age a demanding task. 3 
Fichte had a vast capacity for sustained and detailed argument, but he rarely 
stepped back to a wider framework to provide transitions, overviews, or 
simple statements of the conclusions that his arguments advanced. Even if 
by August 1795 the attentive reader had the whole work before her and 
could appreciate the practical part-which employs a novel psychological 
vocabulary to construct the subconscious (or in principle unconscious) 
platforms for modeling empirical consciousness- there were still few dues 
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about the author's systematic intentions and how these particular discus­
sions of presentation and feeling advanced them. 
Before Fichte came on the scene in 1793-94, Reinhold had cleared 
the ground for a system of transcendental philosophy by demanding that 
Kant's writings be turned into a philosophical system. Yet his own work 
substituted for a pliilosoplrical system a popularization of Kantian episte­
mology, for Reinhold could not think any farther than the sheer givenness 
of subject-object polarity in empirical consciousness.4 Fichte takes the 
same contents in the Grund/age and goes beyond the "facts of conscious-
. ness" to a foundational or "principled" deduction of the being-for-a-sub­
ject of objectivity as such (i.e., a deduction of presentation) and of the 
subject's drive-to-alter-objectivity as such (i.e., a deduction of appetition).5 
It is these deductions that transform facts of consciousness into Theory of 
Science. Fichte added argument or logical rigor to support the "facts" and 
so turned the Kantian transcendental (or heuristic) analysis of conscious­
ness into theory, or as it was then said: science. 
Fichte publicly laid claim to this accomplishment in the "Introduc­
tions" to Theory of Science he published in 1797-98. What he does not 
do is explain the peculiarity of this first version of the first Wissensch.aftslehre 
and its tortured deductions. I find it is similar to Gottfried Leibniz's Mon­
adology: the construction of "spiritual substance" as a psychic machine 
driven by the opposed forces of perception and appetition.6 Like Leibniz's 
elegant metaphysical construction, Fichte's deduction of objectivity or 
empirical limitation inside consciousness has two interrelated sides: what 
from the cognitive side supplies objectivity because it is felt to be sheer 
limitation or "check" is from the practical side self-affection or the non­
causing causality of striving.? Though this double deduction of objectivity 
(i.e., the set of necessary conditions for empirical consciousness) is in its 
own right an argumentative tour de force, the basic task of the Theory of 
Science is to show transcendental idealism: explanation from the point of 
view of the experiencing subject, free of contradiction. As Fichte read 
Kant's text, Kant's philosophy was not free of contradiction, especially in 
its unargued adopted of the "thing in itself" as the ground of objectivity. 
In place of this ad hoc (or unexplained) explainer, Fichte.'s deduction of 
objectivity provides a coherent platform for anchoring more detailed 
accounts of logic, knowledge, nature, society, law, and morality and for the­
oretically unifying them all as products of the l's self-realizing activity or 
spontaneity. Fichte himself seems unaware that "system" is possible only as 
a coherentist, not a foundational program. 
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Fichte does not announce that the Grundlage works a highly abstract 
abstractive reflection upon the I's activity,8 and that it uses arguments both 
intricate and pedestrian to convey i11tellect11<1l intuition of the I in its com­
pletely skeletal, transcendental (i.e., wholly nonempirical) shape. Nor does 
he admit that the work ·provides only foundations for an eventual system, 
or better, a logical canon for all possible systems that do not in principle 
exclude an account of consciousness. Some early programmatic statements 
by Fichte suggested that an idealistic philosophy as a totality would con­
nect empirical cognition with action and resolve the object-dependence of 
cognition into the infinite moral task of object-conquest. Though 
Goethe's stage manager might promise scenic excursions through heaven, 
· earth, and hell, Fichte makes no such extravagant promise in 1794-95.9 He 
cannot at the start display the whole pageant of the realm of conscious­
ness: sensation, matter, nature, individual will, community, world, and prov­
identially ordered history. Schel1ing will do this concisely and beautifully 
in the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, a work that lives up to its 
name. Eschewing this large canvas and grand theme, Fichte first tackles the 
question of the foundation of idealism at its problematic core: if there is to 
be idealism, one must find an explanation for objectivity and for the object­
dependent states of presentation-which :run through and mediate all acts 
of empirical consciousness, volitional and affective and well as directly cog­
nitive. If at any point objectivity is ·explained by objects, by "things" on 
which the I and its activity depend, idealism is abolished and the freedom, 
spontaneity, and self-positing activity that idealism seeks to defend are 
swept away. 
For one wishing to make a philosophy of Kant's Criticism, Kant's 
resort to a "thing in itself" as a final ground of reality and objectivity was 
more than a minor difficulty: Some accmmt of objectivity is needed, some 
explanation of the intractable resistance of the known to alteration by 
consciousness and for the imperviousness of empirical reality to alteration 
by will. Absent this, presentation would be indistinguishable from dream, 
present sensation from one imaginatively reproduced. But if the philoso­
pher takes the realistic path and ontologically privileges objectivity, he 
makes knowledge a commerce of things imaged and things "without" and 
the knower becomes a machine among things, a shuttle shifting between 
woof and warp, not the activity of relating, interrelating, self-relating. 
Realism can product "picture theories,'' but never a viewer of the picture. 
There is no inching into realism, no quiet accommodation with dogma­
tism. Reinhold had made all the accommodations; battling for a textually 
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"correct" Kant, he had lost the war for idealism. The activity that is I and 
does I must be beginning, middle, and end for transcendental idealism. 
In 1795 Schelling was finishing his theological studies at Tiibingen, where 
he had deeply studied Plato and Kant. Irritated by the "theologizing" Kan­
tians there who wished to use Kant's moral postulate of God's existence to 
make quick work of their apologetics, Schelling made the question of the 
possibility of a systematic transcendental philosophy his own.10 Though he 
has been represented as a mere popularizer and disciple of Fichte's early in 
his career (not least of all by Fichte himself) l 1 Schelling in many ways 
shows himself to be Fichte's equal in the years of supposed "discipleship." 
In 1794-1797 Schelling is more consistently interested in the scope and 
completeness of systematic philosophy than Fichte is, while Fichte is more 
·careful about guarding the transcendental perspective and securing its 
foundations. Schelling's taste for abstraction pulls him away from the tran­
scendental perspective, both in theoretical philosophy and in practical 
domains such as ethics and philosophy of history. In the early essays that 
Fichte was pleased to read as evidence of discipleship I find more meta­
physical anticipations of the identity philosophy of the 1801 Presentation of 
My System than I do evidence of a careful thinking along with Fichte. The 
latter's detailed phenomenology of cognition and volition is missing; in its 
place is the metaphysical scaffolding for the grand architecture of system. 
Though both philosophers use some version of the contrast between 
dogmatism and criticism to situate their vies, Schelling is consistently 
attracted (and repelled) by the explanatory seamlessness of dogmatism, per­
sonified in the steel rigor of Baruch de Spinoza's axiomatized meta­
physics.12 Though he sometimes allies himself with a pure transcendental 
position from 1794 through 1800, Schelling is receptive toward Spinoza's 
fatalism or the absence of freedom, at least on the level of empirical voli­
tion. 13 Or to put it another way, Schelling lacks Fichte's vivid intuition that 
spontaneous activity is the core of selfhood, or that the I is self-realizing as 
self-thinking. He prefers the third-person grammar of production to 
describe the transcendental subject and its activity, while Fichte favors the 
first-person language of self-positing. In On, the I as Prindple, Schelling uses 
the terms "I" and "the absolute" interchangeably. 
As I read Schelling's essays of 1794 and early 1795, I find Spinoza as 
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obvious an influence as Fichte. Accordingly, I find little surprising in the 
metaphysical ambivalence Schelling voices later in 1795 in the Philosophical 
Letters on Dogmatism and Critids1n. Though he there ranks the 111eory tif Sd­
ence alongside Kant's Critique as a universal standard to measure all possible 
philosophies, he nonetheless finds nati.1ralistic metaphysics equally choice­
worthy as philosophy of freedom. 14 All theoretical philosophies have posed 
the same unanswerable problem: Why is there experience at all? (Kant); 
Why has idea stepped out of the absolute and become opposed to objects? 
(Spinoza, rephrased by Lessing); Why are my perceptions accompanied by 
the feeling of necessity and unalterability? (Fichte). Schelling finds the 
basis for choice between systems is personal and idiosyncratic: logically 
considered, the option for fatalistic self-annihilation under dogmatism is as 
cogent as is the choice for autonomy.15 
We now turn directly to Schelling's On the I. The essay was occa­
sioned, inspired if you will, by receipt of the first fascicle of the Grund/age. 
Its title reflects that inspiration, and the first eight sections paraphrase of 
Fichte opening three sections on the fundamental principles, both in their 
content and their vocabulary. That the reflection is direct can be seen in 
Fichte's reception of it as a popularization of his own work. Comments he 
made to Reinhold about the his dissatisfaction with the literary form of 
the Gnmdlage, and about the desirability of a reader linking up with his 
intuitions, not his words, show Fichte was more interested in having others 
share his general position than he was in their recitation of a catechism. 16 
Fichte, however, seems not to have noticed that Schelling's adherence to 
the transcendental position soon wears thin in On the I, just as it had in 
Schelling's first work, 011 the Possibility ,if a U11itlersal Form ,if Pltifos<Jp/iy. The 
public noted their difference more carefully; in his historical review, Rein­
hold suggests that Fichte and Schelling made the breakthrough to a puri­
fied Kantian philosophy at roughly the same time.17 
How faithful a reflection of Fichte's line of thought is found in even 
these opening sections of Schelling's essay? Fichte's style of thought is 
original and rigorously systematic or deductive; his writing is generally a 
long march from hypothesis to conclusion, uninterrupted by metacom­
ment or historical comparisons. Schelling, on the other hand, is a synthetic 
or historical thinker who works at some distance from direct hypothesis 
and argumentation, though he will argue to cinch a point. When Fichte 
speaks of a philosophy founded on principles and of the necessity for an 
unconditional principle, he seems to be making a plainly logical demand. 
When Schelling paraphrases the same arguments one sees-as in the most 
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Fichtean parts of the 1794 Ut1iversal Form essay, where absolute philosophy 
is viewed as an interpenetration of form and content, and where what is to 
be thought determines how it is to be thought-that the discussion is also 
driven by historical figures and their similar styles of argument, e.g., by 
Plato's quest for a nonhypothetical and deductive science or by Reinhold's 
search for a philosophy secured by universal principles. In that essay 
Schelling in fact takes Fichte's I-the principle that unites form (identity) 
and content (selfhood)-as but one convenient illustration of this deduc­
tive model of absolute philosophy.18 Since his concern is more with meta­
physics than epistemology or psychology, he feels free to abstract the log­
ical content from Fichte's three basic principles and use the so-called laws 
of identity, sufficient reason, and synthesis to generate Kant's quite unex­
plained table of categories.19 
Schelling's attempt to deduce Kant's categories in Universal Form is an 
original effort on his part to unify Kantian philosophy, as is the final sec­
tion of On the I where he brings all the forms of judgment Kant discussed 
under the general heading of a modal synthesis which progresses from pos­
sibility, to actuality, to necessity. By contrast, Fichte uses Kant's categories 
in the theoretical section of the Gnmdlage (§ 4) in a "destructive" rather 
than deductive manner: the argument reduces all the categories of rela­
tion--cause and effect, substance and accident, and reciprocal determina­
tion-to the paradoxical idea of a "determinate determinability." When 
thought gives up trying to think this thought and "imagination'' is brought 
in to reinterpret it as the wavering inside and beyond a boundary that is 
intuition, and when that interpretation is surpassed as well in the curious 
alienation of productive activity to a "fictive" not-I in the "Deduction of 
Presentation," it seems that Fichte has dissolved the theoretical into nporfo 
and that only recourse to models of action will permit the stabilization of 
any discourse about cognition. 
Even when Schelling is conceptually the closest to Fichte in Ott the I, 
he speaks a different language. In the first section of the Gnmdlage Fichte 
describes the I as pure self-positing and pure activity, as that which exists 
in virtue of its self-positing and vice versa, as simultaneously agent and 
product, action and cause of action.20The language is not particularly psy­
chological, but it does focus on act, action, and agent. Schelling. however, 
takes pains not to speak of the I as a subject: if it is called "I," it is at the 
conclusion of a process of reasoning similar to the "negative theology" of 
the medievals. The absolute and unconditioned cannot be a1-i object, argues 
Schelling, for an object is both a thing and something conditioned: be-
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thinged, or limited by other things. But by the same reasoning the uncon­
ditioned cannot be a subject either, for subjects "have" objects and their 
subjecthood is conditioned by their epistemic dependence on an object. 
To speak of an "unconditioned" subject would be almost as oxymoronic as 
to speak of an absolute object. Philosophers ought to speak carefully, scolds 
Schelling, and not fall into blather about the "existence" of God or a "thing 
greater than which cannot be conceived." To call the unconditioned "the 
absolute I" may be permitted as a concession to inexact habits of speech, 
but its sole meaning is the 11ttaly ,umobjerti11e.21 When· Schelling includes 
this essay in his Wtirks in 1809, after the public break with Fichte, he under­
scores the '"purity" of its conception of transcendental idealism and its lack 
of contamination by the subjectivism (Fichte's, of course) which later 
befell philosophy.22 
Schelling could not (or choose not to) follow the theoretical deduc­
tions of the Gnmdla~l(e, for he is not interested at this point in Fichte's pre­
cise problem: the objectivity and necessity conveyed by presentation, even 
when explained from the l's activity and self-positing. He instead chooses 
to do what Fichte does not, or to do extensively what Fichte does briefly, 
to characterize the absolute I in terms of categories. If one takes "cate­
gories" in the strict sense Kant gave to the term, neither philosopher "cat­
egorizes" the unconditioned I. Fichte connects I am! with I thiuk! or self­
positing to explain the self-realization and self-assertion involved in the J's 
positing, but beiug or existence is not a Kanti~m category. Schelling charac­
terizes the unconditioned I at length, but not in terms of finite categories, 
e.g., multiplicity, or finite substance, or causality, for these can be applied 
only to objects or finite things. He does employ the metacategories used 
to group the twelve: quantity, quality, relation, and ,n()dality. In general, his 
approach is negative-theological here, too, as in the basic characterization 
of the unconditioned principle. He begins to work through the Kantian 
table in a straight line, e.g., denying empirical unity, plurality, or multi­
plicity and so concluding to supernumerical unity. His argument soon 
veers back to Spinoza's Ethics, however, and under the metacategory of 
"quality" it asserts the infinity, indivisibility, and immutability of· the I. 
Under relation, Schelling again follows Spinoza rather than Kant and 
ascribes to the 1 absolute immanent causality rather than moral or purpo­
sive causality. He treats modality not as a metacategory, hut even in con­
sidering the triad of possibility, actuality and necessity, he most plainly 
departs from Kant's guidance. These concepts which Kant thought not real 
categories, i.e., not stricdy objective features of phenomena, but points of 
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view dependent 011 our per;ception and judgment of thingst Schelbug caUs 
the "sylleps-i.s of all categories,'' or ''the sylleptiical concepts of ,aU synthesis." 
A certain fid1tean lmi6cation of Kant's table is achieved here, it should be 
noted, for po,ss:ilbility, actuality, and necessity an~ interpreted as thesis, 
antithesis, and synthesis. 
ff one reviews On the I's argument as a whote, one finds two distinct 
(not easily ,11ecnnciled) styles of thought in ip:1-ay. O ,n the one hand, there is 
the transcendental idea1isin1 of Kanit and Fichte th.wt ,demands th.at the 
thinkable be 1iirnfoed by the con.diti-ons of phenomenal subje,ct-objectivity, 
and on the other, the nieltaphysical monism of Spinoza that does not h-es-
. itt~rte ito charac,terize the who.le as such, or even rto ta!k-e the p,rincip-le for the 
explanation of entities ititside experience a<s itself an item of philosophical 
im;:esitigation. Had ithey carefully -read each other's wri1tings and gott-en dear 
about their own .assumptiom;, Fichte and Schelling would have sta:rted 
bickering much eadier th.an they do in their ,correspondenc-e of 
1800-1802,. Schelling's gradlually gmwing into !his "own" system, the 
system of identity, is largely a matter of him getting dear about his S;pillil­
oz,i:sm, namely-, re,cogniz1ng the :logical impossibility of being Ka.intian and 
Spinozist. Though I have s,uggested in prinit that the objective id~alisms of 
Schdling and Hegd were merely an ex1tension of transcendental ide­
alism-on the formal side toward heuristic uni.fication, on the material 
side. roward a broaderne-d notion of "experience" that included cornmulJili.ity, 
social interaction.1 even wodd history-I now see such ,that was not the 
case., how1ever much I wish iit were. The idend.,ty philosophers snuck : uonnd 
the transcendenrtal :in order to return to die transcendent; they rexpl-oited 
,the ambi;guity of theological language applied to ,cu.lturr:a1 entities to do so. 
Jeavillilg it unclear whether they talked of the abs,olute whether .they were 
talking of the'''One and AU" o.ir -of a ''whole of parts." Our histories of phi­
losophy in thei,r desi-ce to see the We:ltJeist working in a tidy, linear patltern 
generally om.it the uncomfortable fact that both Fichte and ScbeUing even­
itually .iretll!lrn to philo:soplhical theism. 
How much was Sch1eUiing prevented &o;m app,reciating the Theory of Sci­
ence by ,the Grnndlage's truncated pubiication? A,t the time he wroite On the 
l, he had not seen the se,otion on the foundation of practical philosophy se,c­
tion mat was issu.1edl ait betweenJuly and August 17'95. Though this lacks a 
III 
~ ~~~_v.:_mich=._Pri,•~/1••~ 
lucid and popular commentary that would coordinate it with earlier s·ec­
tions of the work, grappling with it is crucial for any reader who would 
understand Fichte's struggle over the congruence of the empirical I, depen­
dent on the not-I in its presentational mode, with the absolute I, stipulated 
to he self-realizing and active without external limitation. Without a 
glimpse into the double .exorcism of the not-I from the system, once in the 
deduction of presentation where it is explained as the l's own activity, alien­
ated and hence pictured by the imagination as alien, and again in the deduc­
tion of drive where difference is seen as primitively inhabiting the self 
because the self is self-affected or acts against itself as noncausing causality, 
it is impossible to see that the Gnmdlage's train of thought comes to com­
pletion. If Fichte's reader does not follow the hints in section three of "The 
Concept of Theory of Science" and think along with him how the prac­
tical Wissenscheftslehre is really the foundation of theoretical, she is likely to 
misread the "foundations of practical theory of science" as the whole prac­
tical philosophy sketched out in the Aenesidemus review, and to think of 
the Grund/age's striving as moral endeavor, the collective historical drift of 
the human community to realize freedom. Schelling indicates in On the I 
that this is his general understanding of Fichte's philosophy as a whole.23 
The only thing, however, that is deduced in the Gnmdlage's concluding 
section is bare will, Leibnizean appetite, the impetus toward the minimal 
alteration of empirical reality. It is this appetite, or drive, that interacts with 
presentation in that it is drive to cltange presentation, which explains, if any­
thing does, how the empirical I is linked to an objective reality by which it 
affects itself. In the context of the whole Theory of Science, presentation 
reduces to will, epistemology to philosophy of action; it is this all-embracing 
stance of action within the constraints af empirical jinilllde a11d intersubjective limi­
tation that provides the platform for ethics, and social and legal philosophy. 
Schelling is not far from this view of practical philosophy as a whole: 
his consistent Spinozism drives him to embrace an empirical determinism 
at the phenomenal level, and to deny the possibility of anything being 
other than just as it is on the absolute level, where freedom is absolute but 
no alternatives are possible. The reason he adopts this position, however, is 
the immanent causality of the unconditional in dependent and condi­
tioned being; he is not yet able to conceive, as he will in the System (?{Tran­
scendental Idealism, that the final locator of the phenomenal individual is the 
interaction of wills in community, or the self-affection of will as a mutu­
ally constraining community of agents. 
Schelling's faithfulness to the Fichtean transcendental construction 
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decays at the point in On the I where the ultimate Spinozistic metaphysical 
category of infinite power is deployed to explain the causality of the uncon­
ditioned upon the conditioned. 24 Had Schelling read the Gnmdlage's con­
clusion, perhaps he would have been turned away from the arid metaphys­
ical monism of his essay's second half and explored in earnest the affective 
context into which Spinoza used the idea of power a.s conatus or "endeavor 
to exist." Schelling in fact shows no great interest in human psychology or 
morals or philosophy of action, until he abandons the naruralism of his 
early systems for the spi~itualism of his 1809 essay on human freedom. 
IV 
There are obvious limitations to a comparative study of two philosophers 
who shared similar visions of the task of philosophy, who work indepen­
dently but along roughly parallel lines, who read each other's work casually 
but not fully or in depth. One arrives at no dear linear picture of"'causal 
influence," as if Schelling had wanted to be the devote disciple Fichte took 
him for, nor at any agonal picture of flatly incompatible positions. This dis­
appoints our dramatic or literary expectations, for a tale ought to be more 
significant when edited and retold, and a literary dialogue ought to have clear 
positions and figures, e.g., a Hylas and a Philonous. 
Perhaps a historical comparison can bring the work of Fichte and 
Schelling in 1795 into closer focus. The author of 011 the I and that of the 
Foundations stand to each other as do Spinoza and Leibniz.25 Spinoza and 
Schelling share a taste for the metaphysical big picture, and prefer to see 
substance infinite and will or action finite. Fichte and Leibniz share a taste 
for the phenomenal, for explanation from the point of view of the per­
ceiver and agent; they share a vitalism as well. Nonetheless Fichte and 
Schelling (sometimes, for the latte.r) are post-Kantians and work with the 
hypothetical-heuristic territory of transcendental supposition, while the 
pre-Kantian figures acknowledge no in principle intellectual constraints 
upon their thinking, once the enigmatic Cartesian criteria of clarity, dis-
tinctness, and adequacy have been met. · 
Whether the above comparison is illuminating, I am not sure. If one 
can recognize, however, that Schelling's construal of transcendental idealism 
in 1794-95 is metaphysical or Spinozist, that it reifies and distorts the tran­
scendental point of view, perhaps this can shed light on what Fichte was 
really doing in the Gnmdlage. It is dear that this work does not ca.sh in the 
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broad systematic promises of "Aenesidemus'' and the "Concept of Theory 
of Science," part 3. I have suggested instead that it brings forward a two­
part yoked analysis of the structures of action-and-reaction on which any 
detailed account of human cognition would have to be built: the logical 
foundation for phenomenologies of perception and of volition.26 The first 
part of this analysis, section 4, is a statics of finitude, an account of the epis­
temic dependence of subjecthood on objectivity. It seems to be an ideal­
istic counterpart of the account Spinoza offered of mind as idea or reflec­
tion of a state of body (or self), or rather of change <'f state in the body (or 
self). The second part, section 5, is a dymm,ics of finitude. It seems to be a 
reflection of Leibniz's monad or perception substance that is driven by 
appetite, i.e., by anticipation of d1t11ti!e of state. The finite subject or empirical 
I perceives only its own states, or change of states, and its awareness is either 
coupled with or foeled by movement toward a change of state. Because the 
I never is a state, but is always and only the process of changing states, the 
space between subject and object first opens up and the difference between 
ha11fr1t, states and the states that arise and pass away comes to prominence. 
That opening up of the epistemic and logical-predicative gap is conscio11s-
11ess. If this is what Fichte did, we indeed have a deduction of the Rein­
holdean .. facts of consciousness."27 
NOTES 
1. Fichte got a hint that philosophy might be built upon the I from the 
preacher Johann Schulz of Konigsberg in 1791. By 1793-94 he was privately 
announcing his conviction that the I was both self-realizing and self-thinking. See 
Manfred Zahn, "Editorischer Bericht" to J. G. Fichte, Cnmdlage der gesammte,r l-·Vis­
senscl1q(ts/c/,re ( 1794-95), in J C. Ficlrte-Cesamta11~f(,1lie ,fer Ba)1erisc/1c11 Akaclcmie der 
Wisse11sd1a{ten , eds. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky, and Erich Fuchs 
(Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frornmann-Holzboog, 1964tf), 1/2: 176, 177n. 
2. Fichte wrote Ucbcr den Be.'<rtff dfr Wissr11scl1'!frsle/,re between February and 
April 1794, wbile delivering the outlines of what would become the Cnmdla,.(?e in 
a lecture series at Zurich. Though there was no firm outline of the practical phi­
losophy at thjs time, the main framework of the theoretic-al philosophy was in 
place. Ibid. pp. 179-81. 
3. Grund/age der iesm11111re,r i,i.,,'ssensduftslel,rr's first number, comprising the 
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completed approximation to infinity .... This concept of striving (the necessity of 
which has to be demonstrated) provides the foundation of the second part of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, which is called the Practical Part." "On the Concept of the 
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9. Faust I: 339-342. 
10. In a letter to Hegel of January 6, 1795, Schelling speaks of contemporary 
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Fichte's quip that it requires the genius of a Socrates to figure Kant out, and points 
to him as the "new hero" on the philosophical scene. The event that occasions 
Schelling's enthusiasm is his receipt of the first section of Gn.mdlage der .~esammte11 
Wissensd1eftslelire. See Hartmut Buchner, "Editorischer Bericht," Vim, Id1, pp. 
18-20. 
11. On July 2, 1795, Fichte writes to Reinhold about the publication of Mlm 
Ich. He sees it only as a commentary on his thought; though he is happy it can 
serve as a vehicle for his being understood by those who cannot understand lrim, 
he wishes that ScheUing would acknowledge its unoriginal · origin. Fichte 
nonetheless pronounces himself pleased with the work, especially with its refer­
ences to Spinoza, whose system is most apt to explain his own. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
12. In a letter to Hegel on February 4, 1795, Schelling replies to his friend's 
question whether he thinks Kant's moral "proof" for God's existence leads to a 
personal God. He says he has traded theism for a Fichtean, purely moral concept 
of deity:"In this respect, I have become a Spinozist. Do not be surprised." He clar­
ifies the remark by explaining that both Kant and Spinoza, pose concepts of an 
absolute, Kant one of the I or its freedom, Spinoza one of an absolute object or 
not-I. Ibid., p. 23. Buchner cautions that this text ought to make an interpreter 
wary of seeing too much Fichte in Vim, Id,. But he also notes that the Spinoza 
that Schelling incorporates into this essay is a Spinoza viewed through transcen­
dental lenses (ibid., p. 27). 
13. In the letter to Hegel of January 6, 1795, where he praises Fichte as the 
present-day hero of philosophy, Schelling doses by voicing his determination to 
provide a modern (transcendental?) counterpart of Spinoza's Ethics (Ibid., p. 19.) 
14. Pltifosopltischr Bri~fe iiber D()gmatismm 1111J Kriticism11s (1795) in Siimtfiche 
H•hke, hrsg. K. EA. Schelling (Stuttgart & Augsburg: Cotta, 1856 ff), voL 1, pp. 
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15. Ibid., pp. 310-13. 
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philosophy will be able to dispel (Zahn, "Editorischer Bericht," p. t 85). On July 
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23. In an enthusiastic letter to Hegel on February 4, 1795, Schelling pictures 
the relation of theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy this way: in theo­
retical philosophy an infinite sphere is divided up into many finite spheres by the 
positing of limits. A contradiction ensues betW\:en the finite and the infinite, and 
it is suspended only with the breakthrough into the infmite that the practical 
effects. The practical stance 
demands the destruction of finitude and so transports us to the super­
sensible world. (Practical reason does what theoretical reason cannot, 
since it is enfeebled by objects). But we find in the supersensible nothing 
other than our absolute I, for it alone describes the infinite sphere. There 
is no supersensible world for us other than the absolute I. 
Cited in Buchner, "Editorischer Bericht," pp. 22-24. 
24. Section 14 makes clear that ascribing absolute power to the I abolishes 
the supposed ability of a finite mind to act for the best. The rule of wisdom is sus­
pended in favor of the determinations of force (Vom lch, Akademie Ausg11be, pp. 
122-23). To this he joins a spirited polemic against his theological instructors, the 
"seminary" Kantians. Kant's notorious postulates of God's existence, willingness to 
reward merit with happiness, and of the endless duration of sou] have nothing to 
do with morality, which is simply the unconditioned command that the limited I 
become the absolute I. Were this in fact possible, the moral law would be sus­
pended as obligatory and instead become a law of nature (ibid., pp. 125-26). 
25. Schelling makes dear his admiration of Spinoza and his wish to combine 
certain features of Kantianism and Spinozism in the close of the preface to Vom 
lch. Though it is at least programmatically clear that for the Kantian philosophy 
the whole essence of the human is freedom, Schelling thinks that to date this had 
been worked out only in fragments. He voices the hope that he can produce a 
coi,nterpart to Spinoza's Ethics along this line. Vtmi lch, Akademie Ausgabe, I, 2: 78, 
80. Schelling later attempts to for mu late a "system of freedom" in the 1809 essay 
on human freedom. 
26. That there is a logical model of action and reaction for all psychic events 
is a Leibnizean imight: an immaterial substance is defined as one that contains 
force and perception, "force" being the principle of change or action. "On the 
Supersensihle Element in Knowledge, and on the Immaterial · in Nature," in 
Lci11bfliz Selectiom, ed. P. Weiner (New York: Schribne~. 1951), p. 354. 
27. The same opening of a gap explains, i.e., provides a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for, the n;.flection Spinoza posited between idea and ideatum; this 
reflection (based on the registering of changes of state) itself explains self-aware­
ness: the fact that when one has an idea one can also have an idea of the idea. See 
Ethics 2: P13Dem, P16Cor2, Pl9Dem, P21S. 
